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Abstract This paper investigates three models to imple-
ment Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) system with aid of
game theory approach. In particular, the competition
between thermal and renewable power plants is formulated
in three models: namely cooperative, Nash and Stackelberg
game models. The price of TGC is assumed to be deter-
mined by the legislative body (government) which is fixed.
Numerical examples presented in this paper include sen-
sitivity analysis of some key parameters and comparison of
the results of different models. In all three game models,
the parameters that influence pricing of the TGC based on
the optimal amounts are obtained. The numerical examples
demonstrate that in all models: there is a reverse relation
between the price of electricity and the TGC price, as well
as a direct relation between the price of electricity and the
share of green electricity in total electricity generation. It is
found that Stackelberg model is an appropriate structure to
implement the TGC system. In this model, the supply of
electricity and the production of green electricity are at the
highest level, while the price of electricity is at the lowest
levels. In addition, payoff of the thermal power plant is at
the highest levels in the Nash model. Hence this model can
be an applicatory structure for implementation of the TGC
system in developing countries, where the number of
thermal power plants is significantly greater than the
number of renewable power plants.
Keywords Green electricity  Tradable Green
Certificate  Game theory  Renewable energy
Introduction
In the energy sector, climate change and energy security are
significant factors affecting policies, regulations and
investment (REN21 2012; Bazilian et al. 2011).With respect
to growing concerns about climate changes, many countries
have pursued policies to develop clean energy and set
mandatory targets for renewable-source and low-carbon
emission. For instance, European Union (EU) proposes a
goal of 20 % share of renewable energy sources in the
Union’s total energy consumption by 2020 (Zhou 2012).
In global primary energy, the share of renewable energy
could increase from the current 17 to 30 or 75 %, and in some
nations exceed even 90 %, until 2050 (Johansson et al.
2012). Renewable energy (RE) considerably influences over
many areas such as: strengthening economic growth to
promote industrial development and employment, con-
tribute to the transition toward a low carbon development
growth for reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions,
enhancement of technology diversification and hedging
against fuel price volatility to increase supply adequacy, and
facilitating the access to electricity to promote rural devel-
opment and social welfare (Azuela and Barroso 2012; Far-
gione et al. 2008).
Electricity industry is one of the most important sources
of pollution and RE plays a key role in the electricity
generation. Most nations have pursued some policies to
support the electricity generation from the renewable
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energy sources as one of the ways to curb global warming.
In this regard, two of the most common practices are feed-
in tariff and TGC systems (Tama´s et al. 2010).
Some studies tried to answer the question of how does
the feed-in tariff could affect selection of the energy
resources. For example, Mahmoudi et al. (2014) proposed a
computational framework for helping the government to
determine the optimal taxes and subsidies for each indi-
vidual electric power plant in a competitive electricity
market, regarding the emitted pollutants of the power
plants.
Taxes and subsidies on some technologies may help the
government to achieve sustainable development objectives.
The existing literature on TGC proposes that when the
substantial investments in RE are already in place and the
technologies are at a mature stage, switching to imple-
mentation of a TGC system is an appropriate alternative
(Ciarreta et al. 2014).
A TGC system is introduced as renewable portfolio
standards (RPS) or renewable obligations (RO) recognized
in the RE Sector where the producers, retailers, consumers
and distributors are required to accept obligation of a cer-
tain share in the production or consumption of electricity
from renewable sources (Aune et al. 2012). The main
objective of the TGC system is increasing the share of
credit for green electricity generation from renewable
sources, with the minimum possible cost for the govern-
ment (Vogstad 2005).
Tama´s et al. (2010) showed TGC system more efficient
from feed-in tariff. RPS laws or TGC system use in 25
countries at national level and 54 states/provinces in the
United stated, Canada, and India (REN21 2014). The
Renewable Obligation was introduced in the UK in 2002 to
support generation of green electricity. The RO target
started at 3 % for the first period 2002–2003, increased
annually by 1 % until it reach to 15.4 % in 2015–2016
(Zhou 2012). The UK increased the level of support for
offshore wind producers under its green certificate
scheme to 0.26 USD/KWh. At the beginning of 2012, the
Norwegian–Swedish TGC market lunched to develop
renewable capacity to produce 26/4TWh up to 2020.
Romania implemented new law aimed at limiting the
capacity expansion, growth of new players and more
interesting for investors of TGC market (REN21 2014).
In this paper, competition of the power plants is mod-
eled in the electricity market and the TGC system under
producers’ obligations. Therefore, some models are
developed for two situations: competitive (Nash and
Stackelberg equilibriums) and cooperative situations. Fur-
thermore, adopting a numerical example, the impact of
minimum share of electricity supply from RE sources and
price of certificates on total supply and price of electricity,
moreover, payoff and production of the power plants.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.
‘‘Literature review’’ section briefly discusses the related
literature. ‘‘Prerequisites and assumptions’’ section
describes the prerequisites and assumptions. ‘‘Model for-
mulation’’ section provides the formulations of power
plants problems. ‘‘Game theory models’’ section presents
three game theory models for implementation of TGC
system. ‘‘Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis’’
section discusses a numerical examples along with a set of
sensitivity analyses. ‘‘Conclusion’’ section provides the
conclusions and several directions for future research.
Literature review
TGC are financial assets provided for green electricity
producers for the amount of green electricity measured and
fed into the electricity grid. The TGC may be considered as
a market-oriented environmental subsidy (Vogstad 2005;
Boots 2003). In other words, the renewable power plants
that generate electricity from RE (green electricity), benefit
from a double source of income, from the sale of both
physical electricity and green certificates (Farinosi et al.
2012).
A system of TGC is both an economic mechanism that
supports RE production and a regulatory instrument
available for public authorities to reach a specified goal for
RE production. The market for TGC consists of supply and
demand for certificates (Nielsen and Jeppesen 2003).
Demand is created by a politically determined target for the
share of electricity production or consumption from RE.
Based on the policies of each country, any point on the
electricity supply chain can be required to obligation of the
set of targets. As shown in Fig. 1, the obligation can be
placed at: supply, transmission, distribution and con-
sumption electricity (Mitchell and Anderson 2000).
The TGC are generated by producers of green electric-
ity. A certificate is issued for a certain amount of the green
electricity generated. The size of certificate can be 1 MW/h
or higher units of the green electricity produced. The cer-
tificates can be sold by the renewable power plant sepa-
rately from the physical electricity. Every entity in the
electricity supply chain like producers (except the green
electricity producers), distributors, retailers, importers and
Obligation Options 
Supply Transmission Distribution Consumption 
Fig. 1 Obligation option
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consumers can be obliged to purchase a certain portion of
the certificates from a renewable power plant. Financial
market for the certificates may be created from interaction
between the green electricity producer (as the TGC sup-
plier) and the obligated entity (as the TGC demand). For
instance, because the customer’s obligation is considered in
Denmark (Nielsen and Jeppesen 2003), interaction between
customers and green electricity producers creates a market
for TGC. In this approach, the consumers are obliged to
consume a minimum quota of the green electricity, by
purchasing the related certificates.
In designing of the TGC system, there are four mecha-
nisms to organize the demand for certificates (Schaeffer
et al. 2000):
1. An obligation on an entity in the electricity supply
chain, to purchase a certain number of certificates
within a certain period,
2. Setting a fixed price at which the certificates can be
sold to a certain actor,
3. A tendering process aiming at buying the certificates,
4. Voluntary demand.
There are a few formal analyses of the TGC system
(Tama´s et al. 2010). Amundsena and Mortensen (2001)
investigated the electricity and TGC markets in the case of
Denmark assuming a perfect competition. They showed
that an increase in the mandatory quota of the green
electricity decreases the total supply and increases the
electricity price. In the same case and method, Jensen and
Skytte (2003) demonstrated that there is a linear relation-
ship between the electricity price and the certificate price.
They showed that the linear coefficient depends on the
mandatory quota of green electricity by assuming a perfect
competition on the certificates market and monopolistic
competition on the electricity market. In a case study of
Italy, Lorenzoni (2003) explained a formal implementation
of the TGC system in 2002 and showed possible trends of
the quantity and price of the certificates in the coming
years. Verbruggen (2004) described details of the TGC
system in some regions of Belgium and analyzed the
established TGC system in Flemish region.
Ford et al. (2007) used system dynamics method to
anticipate the price of certificate in a market TGC, to
promote generation of the electricity from wind energy.
They concluded that the certificate price climbs rapidly in
the early years after a market opens. After a few years, it
would lead to this fact that the electricity generated from
the wind energy exceeds the requirement. Zhou and Tamas
(2010) investigated the influences of integrating the pro-
duction of green and thermal electricity on performance of
the TGC system. They assumed that both the electricity
and the certificate markets are imperfect. They showed that
total supply of the electricity is greater under integration
than when in disintegration; whereas, the price of TGC in
an integrated market is higher than that of the disintegrated
market.
Colcelli (2012) by quality method discussed the problem
of legal nature of TGC in Italy and concluded that TGC be
regarded as good. Currier (2013) examined a Cournot elec-
tricity oligopoly operated under TGC system with producer
obligation. He calculated parametric optimal percentage
requirement using Bound branches algorithm to sure maxi-
mum social welfare. Fagiani et al. (2013) by system dynamic
approach analyzed the performance of feed-in tariff and
TGC markets. They simulated electricity market a period
which cover 39 years from 2012 to 2050 in case of Spain and
showed Tariffs could obtain better efficiency but also low
effectiveness or over-investment, moreover, TGC perfor-
mances benefit from higher social discount rates. Ciarreta
et al. (2014) analyzed implementation of TGC system in
Spain. Theymodeled interaction between the electricity pool
and TGC market and analyzed this, through solving a
sequential game. They studied the retailer regulation design
that would give lead to a decreasing TGC demand and sim-
ulated the impact of same regulation on the TGC price.
Currier and Sun (2014) investigated performance of
TGC system in electricity market under alternative market
structure. They demonstrated that an oligopolistic market
structure may create more welfare than a competitive
market structure. Fagiani and Hakvoort (2014) analyzed
the impact of regulatory changes on TGC price volatility in
Swedish market and a bigger Swedish/Norwegian market.
By econometrics approach, they showed regulatory change
harms TGC market and bigger Swedish/Norwegian market
has not resulted in lower volatility yet.
Most researchers investigated the electricity market and
the TGC market with economic analysis and systems
dynamic methods. Moreover, most of the previous resear-
ches have concentrated on implementation of the TGC
systems in a specific country. To the best of authors’
knowledge, there is no research in this context which
adopts the game theory approach. Analysis based on game
theory approach helps to policy makers for market struc-
ture design for electricity and TGC market. Some studies
consider to market structure in the case of imperfect and
perfect competition generally by simple economic method.
In this paper, we aim model market structure of electricity
and TGC markets in case of imperfect competition Cournot
oligopoly and monopoly under fixed TGC price policy.
Prerequisites and assumptions
For simplicity of this research, we concentrate on interac-
tion of two power plants: green and thermal electricity
producers. These power plants compete together in the
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electricity markets under the TGC system. Under the TGC
system, a thermal electricity producer is obliged to acquire
a minimum number of green certificates. This number
corresponds to a percentage (quota) of the yearly thermal
electricity generated.
It is assumed that the minimum quota and price of the
certificates are set by the lawgiver. This means that the
price of certificates is fixed and not determined by the
market equilibrium of supply and demand.
Assumptions
The proposed models in this paper are based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
1. Power plants have no limitation on consumption of the
resources.
2. The price of certificates is only at fixed prices in the
long term similar to the former feed-in tariffs.
3. The electricity price is set under a national supply and
demand mechanism (in the local market).
4. There are no limitations on the supply and demand for
the electricity as well as the certificates.
5. There are no excess supply and demand in the markets
of electricity and certificates.
Notations
Before describing the payoff functions for the companies,
the indices, parameters and decision variables are
explained below:
Parameters
a the minimum mandatory quota (percentage) of green
electricity, 0 B a B 1;
pR the profit function of renewable power plant;
pT the profit function of thermal power plant;
p the total payoff of centralized power plant,
(p = pR ? pT);
CT the cost function of thermal power plant;
CR the cost function of renewable power plant;
Pc the price of green certificates ($/MWh), Pc[ 0;
c the cap price of electricity, c[ 0;
b the price elasticity of electricity supply; b[ 0.
Decision variables
Pe the wholesale price of electricity ($/MWh), Pe[ 0;
qT the quantity production of electricity from non-
renewable energy sources (MW), qT C 0;
qR the production of electricity from renewable energy
sources (MW), qR C 0;
Q the total supply of electricity (MW),
Q 0 Q ¼ qT þ qRð Þ.
Model formulation
Producer of renewable power
We adopted profit functions proposed by Currier and Sun
(2014), and considering relation between wholesale price
and end-user price of electricity explained by Amundsen
and Bergman (2012). In their model, producer of green
electricity can sell both electricity generated on the elec-
tricity market as well as certificates on separate market.
The cost of renewable power plant is function of electricity
generated from renewable sources. Therefore, profit max-
imization problem for renewable power plant can be for-
mulated as follows:
Max pR ¼ Pe þ Pc½ qR  CR qRð Þ
S:t:
qR  0 ð1Þ
This means that a renewable producer can receive Pc for
each unit in addition to the electricity price. Cost of the
renewable producer is dependent only on the actual
amount of electricity production. Under the TGC system,
a renewable producer would receive per unit ‘‘subsidy’’
Pc.
Producer of thermal power
A producer of the thermal power can sell the electricity gen-
erated in the electricity market. It is obligated to supply a
certain proportion of the green electricity from total electricity
supplied on the grid. It can fulfill their obligation by either
supplying the green electricity or by purchasing the TGC.
The cost of a thermal power plant is a function of the
electricity generated from the non-renewable sources.
Therefore, the profit maximization problem for the pro-
ducer of thermal power is as follows:
Max pT ¼ Pe  Pca½ qT  CTðqTÞ
S:t:
qT  0 ð2Þ
Thermal producer can receive Pe for each unit of elec-
tricity. Cost of the thermal power is dependent only on the
actual amount of the electricity production. It is obligated
to payment for buying the TGC from the renewable pro-
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ducer, to compensate for the unfulfilled requirement.
Therefore, the thermal producer under the TGC system
virtually pays a per unit ‘‘tax’’ aPc as in Eq. (2). In our
model, only a thermal power plant is obligated to hold a
number of the TGC equal to a times its production.
Cournot model
According to the Cournot model, the price is a function of
the production quantity. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
discussed that if the producers first determine their capac-
ity, and only later are allowed to set a price, the outcome
will be the Cournot equilibrium.
Thus, it can be assumed that the electricity price is a
function of the total electricity generated by the renewable
and non-renewable sources.
Pe ¼ c bQ ¼ c b qR þ qTð Þ ð3Þ
where c the cap is the price of electricity and b is the
price elasticity of the electricity supply. Meanwhile, Q ¼
ðqR þ qTÞ is the total electricity supply. It is assumed that
b[ 0.
Cost function
It is assumed that the cost function of the power plants is
a quadratic function. The cost functions for the renew-
able and thermal power plant can be described as
follows:
CRðqRÞ ¼ aRq2R þ bRqR þ cR ð4Þ
CT qTð Þ ¼ aTq2T þ bTqT þ cT ð5Þ
In Eqs. (4) and (5), it is assumed that aR; bR; aT; bT[ 0,
and the marginal production costs are increasing. Jensen
and Skytte (2003) used the same model for the cost func-
tion of the power plants.
Profit maximization problem for power plants
Substituting Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) into Eqs. (1) and (2), the
problems of power plants can be described as follows.
The profit maximization problem for the producer of
green electricity is given below:
Max pR ¼ ½c bðqR þ qTÞqR þPcqR  aRq2R  bRqR  cR
S:t:
qR0; aR; bR[0 ð6Þ
The profit maximization problem for the producer of
thermal power is given below:





Nash equilibrium (NE) solution is one of the funda-
mental solution concepts in the game theory. NE solution
is where the strategy of each player is the best response
against strategies of the rivals. Because of deviation from
NE would lead to reduction of player’s profit, none of
the players has motivation to reject this strategy. The NE
of the game is defined as follows (Krause et al. 2006):
In a game of n players, the strategy profile P ¼




is a NE if for all I i ¼ 1; . . .. . .; nf g there is:
Ui ¼ P1; . . .. . .;Pn
  P1; . . .. . .;Pi1;Pi;Piþ1; . . .. . .Pn
 
ð8Þ
where Ui is the utility function of the ith player.
Several algorithms have been developed for computing
of NE. The interested reader may refer to Krause et al.
(2004) and Porter et al. (2008). In this study, an NE
approach is used for the Cournot game to calculate the
price equilibrium of the electricity in a competitive market
under a green certificate system.
Based on the NE, qT and q

R will be obtained from
Eqs. (6) and (7) first, then with substitution of qT and q

R
into pR and pT, respectively, the maximum profit of the
power plant will be obtained as pT; p

R:
Proposition 1 If the profit function of the power plants is
concave, the optimal amounts of production for the green
and thermal power plants in the Nash model are
qR N½  ¼
APc þ Bbþ 2aTC
2Dþ 2b2 ð9Þ
qT N½  ¼ 
Pc 2aaR þ 2baþ bð Þ þ b bR þ 2bT  cð Þ þ 2aRðbT  cÞ
2Dþ 2b2
ð10Þ
where A ¼ abþ 2aT þ 2b; B ¼ 2bR þ bT þ c; C ¼
bR þ c; D ¼ 2aRaT þ 2aRbþ 2aTbþ b2. [N] Denotes
the optimum amounts in the Nash model.
Proof of all the propositions are given in ‘‘Appendix’’.
Substituting Eqs. (9) and (10) into Eqs. (6) and (7), an
optimal payoff of the renewable and thermal power plants
is obtained in the Nash game model as follows:
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Since the TGC price is determined by the government and
it is fixed to help the government for pricing the TGC, the
parameters that influence the price of TGC is found based
on the optimal amounts. Substituting qR N½  and q

T N½  into
Eq. (3) gives:
Note that Pc ¼ Pc Pe
 
. Equation (13) shows that there is a
linear relationship between the electricity price and the
TGC price in the Nash game model. The linear coefficient
is negative and depends on the minimum quota of the green
electricity (a).
Cooperative game
In this section, a cooperative game approach is applied to the
problem of thermal–green power plants with respect to the
TGC system. Using this approach, the thermal and renew-
able power plants work together to determine Q and Pe. It is
possible to examine whether the thermal power plant allo-
cates a portion of its capacity to produce the green electricity
to get more profit considering a situation in which it com-
petes with renewable power plants or not? To calculate the
optimal amounts under a cooperative situation, the new
model will be obtained from summation of Eqs. (6) and (7).
Max p ¼ ½c bðqR þ qTÞqR þ PcqR  aRq2R
 bRqR  cR þ ½c bðqR þ qTÞqT
 PcqT  aTq2T  bTqT  cT
S:t :
qR; qT  0; aR;aT; bR; bT[ 0 ð14Þ
Hessian matrix of p in Eq. (14) is:
H ¼ 2b 2aR 2b2b 2b 2aT
 
; the utility function p is
a concave function on (qR, qT) if and only if the Hessian
matrix H is negative definite.
pR½N ¼ ðAPc þ Bbþ 2aTCÞ
c b Pc 2aaR þ 2baþ bð Þ þ b bR þ 2bT  cð Þ þ 2aR bT  cð Þ þ APc þ Bbþ 2aTC
2Dþ 2b2 2
 !
 aR APc þ Bbþ 2aTCð Þ
2Dþ 2b2 2













2Dþ 2b2 þ Pca bT
b










Peð2b2 þ 2DÞ  b2ðBþ bR  2bT  cÞ  bð2CaT  2aRbT þ 2aRcÞ þ 2Dc
ðAbþ 2aaR þ 2abþ bÞ ð13Þ
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Proposition 2 If det Hð Þ[ 0, the optimal amounts for
production of the green and thermal power plants in the
cooperative game model will be:
qR½C ¼
Pc A aT  bð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2 ð15Þ
qT½C ¼
Pc A 2aT  bþ aaRð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2
ð16Þ
where [C] denotes the optimum amounts in the cooperative
game model.
Inserting Eqs. (15) and (16) into (6) and (7), the optimal
payoff of the renewable and thermal power plants in the
Nash game model are found as follows:
Similar to the previous section, Pc is calculated by
substituting qR C½  and q

T C½  into Eq. (3) as follows:
Pc½C ¼
Peðb2  DÞ  2Bb2  2CaTb 2b2bR þ b2cþ Dc
2bðaaR þ A 2aT  bÞ
ð19Þ
Equation (19) indicates that there is a linear relationship
between the electricity price and the TGC price in a coopera-
tive game model. The linear coefficient depends on the mini-
mum quota of the green electricity (i.e., a) but the positive or
negative linear coefficient depends on other parametric values.
Non-cooperative Stackelberg games
This section considers the relationship between thermal
and renewable power plants using a non-cooperative
structure. The interaction between these power plants will
be regarded as a Stackelberg game, where one of the
participants, i.e., the leader, has the initiative and can
enforce its strategy on the its rival, i.e., the follower. The
leader makes the first move and the follower reacts by
playing the best move according to the available infor-
mation. The objective of the leader is to design its move in
such a way as to maximize its profit after considering all
the rational moves that can be advised by the follower.
The renewable producer–Stackelberg model takes the
renewable power plant as the leader and the thermal power
plant as the follower. In this section, the renewable pro-
ducers first generates electricity and sells it to the distrib-
utors then the thermal producers with knowledge about the
issued certificates and the remaining market share will
produce and sell its electricity to the market. Considering
that aim of the TGC system is supporting than increasing
the share of the electricity produced from RE, the thermal
producer–Stackelberg model is not investigated as a ther-
mal producer leader.
Proposition 3 The optimal amounts of production of
green and thermal power plants in Stackelberg game model
are:
qR½S ¼




Pc Abþ 2Dað Þ þ b2Bþ CaTbþ 2DbT  2Dc
4Dðbþ aTÞ
ð21Þ
where [S] refers to the optimum amounts in Stackelberg
model.
Inserting Eqs. (20) and (21) into (6) and (7), the optimal
payoff of the renewable and thermal power plants in
Stackelberg model is obtained as follows:
pR½C ¼
Pc A aT  bð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2
 
Pc þ C  b Pc aaR þ 2A 2b 3aTð Þ þ 2b bR þ Bþ cð Þ þ 2aTC
D b2
 









Pc A 2aT  bþ aaRð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2
 




aT Pc A 2aT  bþ aaRð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTCð Þ
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Substituting qR S½  and q

T S½  into Eq. (3) gives:
Same as the other models, in Stackelberg game model,
there is a linear relationship between the electricity price
and the TGC price. The linear coefficient is dependent on
the mandatory quota of the green electricity (), but the
positive or negative linear coefficient depends on some
other parameter values.
Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis
In this section, a number of numerical examples are pre-
sented with the aim of illustrating some significant features
of the models established in the previous sections. A sen-
sitivity analysis of the main parameters of these models
will also be performed. Note that Examples (1–2) illustrate
the renewable producer–Stackelberg, Nash equilibrium and
cooperative game models, respectively.






to the changes of a are investigated. Let the parameters be
set as below:
c ¼ 150; b ¼ 0:4; aR ¼ 0:6; aT ¼ 0:4; bR ¼ 11;
bT ¼ 8; cT; cR ¼ 101; Pc ¼ 18:
Table 1 lists the results of this example in three game
models. Some important results in the table are also
graphically displayed in Figs. 2, 3 and 4.
The results of Example 1 show that in every three








 and p decrease. The value of Q in the
Stackelberg model will be greater than that of the Nash and
cooperative models (see Fig. 2). In other words, electricity
supply in Stackelberg model is set in the highest level and
this can lead to social welfare improvement.
The renewable power plant acquires the maximum
payoff in the cooperative model where the payoff of the
thermal power plant is minimum. Moreover, the thermal
power plant acquires the maximum payoff in Nash model,
but the payoff of the renewable power plant is minimum.
So, if electricity market structure follows cooperative
scenario, thermal power plant will be eliminated from
market quickly.
As can be seen from Fig. 4, total payoff of the both
power plants in the cooperative model is the highest and
the lowest in the Stackelberg model. Additionally, Fig. 3
illustrates that Pe will be at the highest level in the coop-
erative model and at the lowest level in the Stackelberg
model. This means end-users’ welfare in Stackelberg sce-
nario can be more than other scenarios. As can be observed
in Table 1: pR has the lowest value in the Nash game
model and the highest value in the cooperative model,
while pT is minimum in the cooperative model and maxi-
mum in the Nash model. qR shows the lowest value in the
Nash model and the highest value in the Stackelberg
model, while qT has the lowest value in the cooperative
model and the highest value in the Nash model. Therefore,



















APc þ Bbþ CaTð Þb
2D
þ bT  c
 






4DPeðb2 þ DÞ  b2ð2BaT þ Bbþ CaTÞ  bð2Ca2T  2DbT  2DcÞ þ 4DaTc
bð2AaT þ Ab 2DaÞ ð24Þ
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the cost of pollution in the Nash model will be more than
other scenarios.








;Q and Pe are investigated with the
changes of Pc. Let the parameters be set as below:
c ¼ 150; b ¼ 0:4; aR ¼ 0:22; aT ¼ 0:04;
bR ¼ 16; bT ¼ 8; cT; cR ¼ 101; a ¼ 0:1:
Table 2 summarizes the results of this example in three
models. Some important results of Table 2 are also
graphically illustrated in Figs. 5, 6 and 7. As reported in
the table, the results of Example 2 show that in each of the





increase Q and qR. In other words, with TGC increasing
the electricity price decreases and electricity supply
increases at the same time. So it is expected that imple-
mentation of TGC system leads welfare improvement in all
scenarios. As expected before from Eqs. (1) and (2), Pc has
a direct relation with pR and an inverse relation with p

T. In
every three models, p and pR increases by increasing Pc
but pT decreases.
In the Nash and Stackelberg game models Pe decreases
and Q increases faster than the cooperative game model
with respect to increasing Pc . Results of Examples 1-2
imply that Pe has the lowest value in the Stackelberg model
and the highest value in the cooperative model (Figs. 3, 5).
Q has the highest value in the Stackelberg model and the
lowest value in the cooperative model (see Figs. 2, 6).
Moreover, p has the lowest value in the Stackelberg
Table 1 Sensitivity analysis of game theory models with respect to a
a 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
Nash game model
qR 125.80 126.35 126.91 127.46 128.02
qT 103.16 101.88 100.61 99.33 98.06
Q 228.96 228.24 227.52 226.80 226.08
pR 7179 7243 7308 7373 7437.67
pT 4581 4466 4353 4241 4129.97
p 11,760 11,710 11,661 11,613 11,567.64
Pe 58.42 58.70 58.99 59.28 59.57
Stackelberg game model
qR 166.91 167.65 168.38 169.12 169.85
qT 84.47 83.11 81.76 80.40 79.04
Q 251.38 250.76 250.14 249.52 248.9
pR 7649 7717 7786 7855 7924.55
pT 3039 2939 2840 2743 2648.11
p 10,688 10,656 10,626 10,599 10,572.66
Pe 49.45 49.70 49.94 50.19 50.44
Cooperative game model
qR 149.06 153.30 157.55 161.79 166.04
qT 24.83 19.95 15.07 10.19 5.31
Q 173.89 173.25 172.62 171.98 171.34
pR 11,599.94 11,933.20 12,266.45 12,599.71 12,932.96
pT 1651.10 1297.69 948.68 604.06 263.83
p 13,251.05 13,230.89 13,215.13 13,203.76 13,196.79
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model and the highest value in the cooperative model
(Figs. 4, 7).
Example 3 In this example, the changes of a versus Pc in
three Nash, Stackelberg and cooperative game models [i.e.,
Eqs. (13), (19), (24)] are evaluated. Let:
c ¼ 150; b ¼ 0:4; Pe ¼ 50; aR ¼ 0:6; aT ¼ 0:04;
bR ¼ 11; bT ¼ 8; cR ¼ 80; cT ¼ 20:
Figure 8 depicts the results of this example in the
models. The obtained results show that by increasing,
certificate price Pc increases in the cooperative and
Stackelberg game models while Pc decreases in the Nash
game model. In the cooperative game model, Pc is the
highest level in comparison with the other models.
The results of this example can be stated as follows: in
the countries which their electricity market structures fol-
low the Nash model, when the green electricity share
increases, certificates price decreases and this leads to
reduction of renewable power plants profit. This may sig-
nify that the TGC system has no appropriate incentives to
produce green power sufficiently. Because in this case,
renewable producer earned low profit from TGC sale.
The results of this paper can be useful for both public
and private investors in the green electricity generation and
other electricity producers. Therefore, the policy makers of
government may adopt these models to design an imple-
mentation structure of the TGC system and to determine
the objectives for generation of the green electricity.
Table 2 Sensitivity analysis of game theory models with respect to a
Pc 10 30 50 70
Nash game model
qR 75.52 95.27 115.03 134.79
qT 125.90 114.65 103.39 92.14
Q 201 210 218 227
pR 3435 5527 8103 11,164
pT 6874 5682 4603 3634
p 10,308 11,209 12,706 14,798
Pe 69.43 66.03 62.63 59.23
Stackelberg game model
qR 91.18 115.04 138.90 162.76
qT 118.78 105.66 92.55 79.43
Q 210 221 231 242
pR 3542 5698 8353 11,507
pT 6107 4811 3667 2675
p 9649 10,510 12,020 14,182
Pe 66.01 61.72 57.42 53.13
Cooperative game model
qR 30.85 73 116 159
qT 132.18 91 50 9
Q 163.03 165 166 168
pR 2120 5918 10,567 16,067
pT 9218 6239 3342 527
p 11,338 12,157 13,909 16,594






















































Fig. 7 Changes of total payoff versus Pc
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Pricing of the TGC is a challenging problem for the gov-
ernment, the parameters which are effective on the TGC
price were shown in various game models. Finally, we
summarize the numerical example results of game theory
models for TGC system. Table 3 draws a comparison
among optimal values of the models.
Conclusion
This paper considers the problem of interaction between
the thermal and renewable power plants under TGC system
conditions. We proposed three game theory models for
TGC system, namely: cooperative, Nash and renewable-
producer–Stackelberg models. These models were ana-
lyzed to implement the TGC system under the producer’s
obligation, assuming fixed prices for the certificates.
Through a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effect of
some main parameters of the model on the thermal and the
renewable’s decisions were evaluated. We showed that
there is a reverse relation between price of the electricity
and price of the certificates. In addition, price of electricity
has a direct relation with the minimum quota. We found
that the electricity supply in the cooperative game is at the
lowest level, while the price of electricity is at the highest
level. In the Stackelberg model, the price of electricity is at
the lowest level and the supply of electricity and the pro-
duction of green electricity are greater than the other
models. In the Nash model, the payoff of the thermal power
plant is at the maximum level and the payoff of the
renewable power plant is at the minimum level.
There are several directions for the future research.
First, producer’s obligation option in the TGC system is
considered, while the other obligation in the TGC system
is both challenging and interesting. Second, time con-
straints were not considered for validation of the certifi-
cates. Using time variables in modeling of the TGC
system can yield useful results. Third, this paper considers
national trade in the electricity market and the TGC
system. It is found that modeling the international trade in
both of the markets with the game theory approach is
interesting. Finally, applying other game theory’s models
to analyze implementation of the TGC system can be
considered. For example, modeling of the TGC system in
the incomplete information mode by Bayesian models is
both interesting and challenging.
Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1 If the second order driven for
Eq. (6) is negative, the profit function of green producer
will be concave. The first-order condition for Eq. (6) is:
opR
oqR
¼ ðPc þ cÞ  ðbqT þ 2bqR þ 2aRqR þ bRÞ ¼ 0:
ð25Þ
Equation (26) is negative if ðPc þ cÞ\ bqT þ 2bqRþð




¼ ðþ2bþ 2aRÞ: ð26Þ
Since the amounts of b and aR are positive, the second-





; therefore, the profit
function of the green producer is concave.Similarly, if the
second order driven for Eq. (7) is negative, the profit
function of the thermal producer will be concave. The first-
order condition for Eq. (7) is as follows:
opT
oqT

















Fig. 8 Changes of Pc versus a
Table 3 Comparison of three
game theory models
Profit of power plants Amount of generated electricity Price of electricity and TGC
pR C½ [p

R S½ [ p

R N½  q

R S½ [ q

R C½ [ q












T C½  q

T N½ [ q

T S½ [ q



















J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:185–197 195
123
Equation (27) is negative if c\ 2bqT þ 2bqR þ aPcþð




¼  2bþ 2aTð Þ: ð28Þ
Since the amounts of b and aT are positive, the second-





; hence, the profit
function of the thermal producer will be concave. From
solving Eqs. (28) and (26), it follows that the optimal
production of power plants are:
Proof for Proposition 2 The first-order condition for
profit function of the power plants in Eq. (18) yields:
opR
oqR
¼ Pc þ c 2bðqT þ qRÞ  2aRqR  bR ¼ 0; ð29Þ
opT
oqT
¼ c 2bðqT þ qRÞ  aPc  2aRqT  bT ¼ 0: ð30Þ
Solving Eqs. (29) and (30), we have:
qR½C ¼
Pc A aT  bð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2 :
qT½C ¼
Pc A 2aT  bþ aaRð Þ þ b Bþ bR  cð Þ þ aTC
D b2 : h
Proof for Proposition 3 To solve the model, qT is first
obtained as a function of qR, then the order condition is first
examined for a profit function of the thermal power plant of
Eq. (30); the best response strategy of thermal power plant
is computed as follows:
qT ¼ aPc þ qR þ bT  c
2ðbþ aTÞ : ð31Þ
Inserting Eq. (31) into Eq. (7) gives:
pR ¼ PcqR þ c b  aPc þ bqR þ bT  c
2ðbþ aTÞ þ qR
  
qR
 aRq2R  bRqR  cR:
ð32Þ
The first-order condition for Eq. (32) yields:
opR
oqR
¼ Pc  b  b
2ðbþ aTÞ þ 1
 
qR þ c
 b  aPc þ bqR þ bT  c
2ðbþ aTÞ þ qR
 
 2aRqR  bR
¼ 0:
ð33Þ
The profit function of the renewable power plant is concave
if the second-order condition for Eq. (33) is negative. The
second-order condition for the renewable power plant gives:
o2pR
o2qR
¼  2aRaT þ 2aRbþ b
2
bþ aT : ð34Þ
Regarding the assumption and parameter values, Eq. (34)
is negative. Therefore, the profit function of the renewable
power plant in this section is found to be concave. From
Eq. (33), it follows that the optimal green electricity pro-
duction is:
qR½S ¼
APc þ Bbþ 2aTC
2D
:
Inserting qR S½  into Eq. (31), the optimal black electricity
production is:
qT½S ¼ 
Pc Abþ 2Dað Þ þ b2Bþ CaTbþ 2DbT  2Dc
4Dðbþ aTÞ : h
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